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Abstract
In trying to explain the drivers of global profit shifting by MNEs we investigate
industry-specific variation in profit shifting and identify determinants thereof. Using
the ORBIS database we show that intangible asset endowment of subsidiaries and the
complexity of MNE groups explain aggregate profit shifting trends and tend to drive
industry specific results. We find that subsidiaries with a high intangible to total
asset ratio have a semi-elasticity of 1.2 compared to 0.78 for low intangible affiliates,
suggesting a significantly larger sensitivity to CIT rate changes. Similarly, subsidiaries
belonging to more complex MNE groups have a higher semi-elasticity (1.11) than those
that are part of less complex entities (0.81). Moreover, we incorporate country-specific
transfer pricing mitigation measures (documentation requirements) into our analysis.
We find significant non-linear mitigation effects, which vary depending on the intangible
endowment of subsidiaries and complexity of MNE groups. On average, the estimated
profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample is reduced by 60 percent four
years after the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements. The findings of
our research provide initial insights on the relative profit-shifting risk associated with
different sectors of MNE activities which may support the design of anti-avoidance
approaches and the allocation of scarce analytical and enforcement resources.
∗We would like to thank Martin Zagler, Jeffrey Owens, Eva Eberhartinger, Andreas Wagener, Christian
Saborowski, Alfons Weichenrieder, Joel Cooper, Komal Mohindra, Richard Stern and participants of the
DIBT research seminar at the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business as well as participants
of the Investment Climate Department research workshop on business taxation at the World Bank for
their helpful comments. All remaining errors and inaccuracies are, of course, our own.
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1 Introduction
In the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, potential tax base erosion through
profit shifting by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) has become a prominent public policy
concern, making headline news and turning into a priority area for international policy
coordination.1 A growing body of evidence, comprehensively analyzed by Heckemeyer and
Overesch (2012), indicates that MNEs do indeed minimize their tax obligations by shifting
profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Studies typically show that pre-tax profitability
of affiliates is decreasing in a jurisdictions tax rate or tax differential with economies hosting
other firms in the same MNE group. These findings seem to hold over different periods
in the last two decades and using a range of public and private information sources at
the national, regional and global level (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008;
Weichenrieder, 2009; Maffini and Mokkas, 2011).
While transfer pricing needs to be analyzed looking at both managerial and tax opti-
mization objectives, opportunities to make use of the relocation of assets or aggressive
transfer (mis)pricing in the case of R&D based intangibles (Grubert, 2003) and the ease of
locating intangibles in low tax subsidiary jurisdictions (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011), the
ownership structure of subsidiaries (Weichenrieder, 2009), and the location of parent com-
panies (Dischinger and Riedel, 2010) have been shown to impact profit shifting behavior.
Another potential driver of an MNE’s profit shifting opportunities is the regulatory frame-
work in host or parent countries. Particularly, the absence of transfer pricing regulations
or lax enforcement of the arms length principle for related party transactions is likely to be
associated with aggressive pricing strategies for profit shifting (Bartelsman and Beetsma,
2003; Beuselinck et al., 2009; Lohse and Riedel, 2012).
This paper aims to add to existing research on profit shifting behavior in two ways:
First, it investigates industry-specific variation in profit shifting and identifies determi-
nants thereof. Using the ORBIS database and drawing on earlier approaches (Huizinga
and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2010; Maffini and Mokkas, 2011), we use a panel
of approximately 16,000 MNE subsidiaries to analyze global profit shifting trends. We
show that intangible asset endowment of subsidiaries and the complexity of MNE groups
explain aggregate profit shifting trends and tend to drive industry specific results. Sec-
ond, we incorporate country-specific transfer pricing mitigation measures (documentation
requirements) into our analysis and find a significant, though lagged, dampening effect on
1See OECD (2013): Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.
2
aggregate shifting behavior. These findings support and extend the observations of earlier
studies, by using a global dataset and by focusing on the introduction of documentation
requirements, a narrow but straightforward proxy for the enforcement of transfer pricing
provisions at the national level. Moreover, we take advantage of the differentiation of
profit shifting channels to show how the effectiveness of documentation rules differs across
sectors.
Our analysis is relevant for the academic and public policy discourse for two related
reasons. With the share of intangibles at the subsidiary level and MNE group complexity,
we identify two important drivers of profit shifting behavior. In addition, the breakdown of
shifting trends across industries informs the ongoing debate on the erosion of tax bases and
provides additional information that may support the design of anti-avoidance approaches
and the allocation of scarce analytical and enforcement resources.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the research questions and summarizes
the related literature. In the following sections we present the data and empirical approach
(3), and findings (4). Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Hypothesis and Background
In very general terms, our core hypothesis is that MNEs operating in industries and coun-
tries with more opportunities and incentives to shift profits post a lower share of earnings
in their subsidiaries operating in high tax jurisdictions. To investigate this premise, we
look at a range of potential industry- and country-specific determinants.
2.1 Identifying Industry Trends and Drivers
The first part of our analysis aims to uncover the determinants of profit shifting by ex-
ploiting industry characteristics.3 In particular, we test whether the share of intangibles
of affiliates and the complexity of the production process (cross-industry activities covered
by an MNE group) explain variations in profit shifting.
Our emphasis on intangibles, a key source of growth and competitiveness for MNEs, is
based on the insight that the valuation of trademarks, copyrights and patents for tax or
2Similar to sector and sub-sector analysis which is commonly used to inform domestic tax administration
risk assessment studies.
3For an early approach differentiating industries see Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003).
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other purposes is a dauntingly difficult task.4 Their intangible nature makes the allocation
and pricing of these assets highly flexible, opening opportunities for tax minimization. The
transfer of intangible ownership or licensing arrangements are thus key areas for transfer
pricing valuations and disputes. It poses many practical challenges that are at the focus
of ongoing coordination efforts at the international level.5 In an early study, using data on
U.S. companies, Grubert (2003) identified an association of the volume of intercompany
transaction and associated profit shifting opportunities with parent R&D intensity. In
addition, Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) showed that patent allocation is affected by the
corporate tax rate differential across European MNEs. Importantly, Dischinger and Riedel
(2011) find that the allocation of intangibles at the subsidiary level can be partly explained
by tax rate differences, and that this allocation corresponds to a larger sensitivity of affiliate
profitability to the tax difference. Building on these findings, we test more generally
whether the relative endowment of a subsidiary with intangibles provides an opportunity
driving profit-shifting activities across key industries.
Driven by increasing international specialization, the transfer pricing implications of
business structures and supply-chains, which tend to include both related and third-party
suppliers, have been a focus area of recent policy discussions.6 Tax planning opportunities
linked to the complexity of MNE groups are difficult to standardize. Requirements for
local presence, for instance, tend to result in local income tax obligations. On the other
hand, the complexity of supply-chains may in itself increase profit shifting opportunities
by adding both to the number and, maybe more importantly, variability of internal cross-
border transactions. The administrative costs and duration of transfer pricing audits, which
require in-depth understanding of the specific economic context, are likely significantly
higher in a more complex cross-sector scenario. Motivated by recently conducted policy
analyses by the OECD and UN on industry value chain segmentation,7 our paper attempts
an initial assessment on the effect of MNE segmentation across industries on profit shifting.
2.2 Capturing the Enforcement of the Arm’s Length Principle
Over the last two decades, governments have increasingly responded to the threat of cor-
porate tax base erosion through transfer mispricing by introducing provisions to regulate
4For a recent overview on intangibles and growth see Andrews and Serres (2012).
5OECD Revised Guidance in June 2012 http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/50526258.pdf
6The OECD extended its transfer pricing guidelines regarding business restructurings in 2010.
7OECD (2012) and UNCTAD (2013).
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transfer pricing based on the arms length principle and by strengthening the capacity of
audit staff. Notably, from 1994-2011, the number of countries requiring detailed report-
ing of related party transactions has increased more than tenfold from 5 to more than
70 (World Bank 2013). In a first attempt to capture country specific transfer pricing
legislation effects, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) report country response coefficients,
explaining some of the differences with the strength of transfer pricing regimes. The au-
thors account for the existence of transfer pricing provisions, documentation guidelines and
specific penalties linked to transfer pricing. However, limited variation among the observed
countries’ enforcement practices in their panel limits the usefulness of these initial find-
ings. Beuselinck et al. (2009) follow a similar intuition, using a binary score for a range of
transfer pricing regulations, including documentation requirements. More recently Lohse
and Riedel (2012) used a more sophisticated scoring system which is presented in Lohse
et al. (2012) and captures the existence of transfer pricing regulation, including the extend
of documentation obligations in the legislation. Similar to these earlier efforts we assess
the effect of regulatory measures on profit shifting activities. As opposed to creating an
index of the strength of transfer pricing regimes, we solely focus on the introduction of
mandatory transfer pricing documentation requirements. We chose this narrow approach
as a proper assessment of transfer pricing risks - guiding enforcement efforts - initially
requires filling information gaps on transactions with associated parties. The introduction
of documentation requirements is therefore commonly assumed to have a strong signaling
and compliance effect on multinationals and can be interpreted as a proxy for actual ad-
ministrative enforcement of the arms length principle. In line with this observation, we
assume that the introduction of an obligation to prepare detailed information on internal
transactions and to document a company’s transfer pricing policy, significantly reduces
profit shifting through mispricing. Additionally, we expect the effect of these requirements
to differ (i) over time given that tax administrations take time to build up capacity in using
the information they obtain through mandatory documentation and (ii.) for sectors, given
that tax administrations may initially focus on simple targets such as distributor margins
or management fees and industries with more complexity and opportunities may be less
deterred by documentation requirements.
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3 Estimation Approach, Information Sources and Sample Selection
3.1 Sample Selection
Our firm-level micro data on MNEs is extracted from the ORBIS database, commercially
offered by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). The database offers administrative information for
more than 50 million private companies globally. The data is collected by national institu-
tions based on legal requirements, and compiled and standardized by BvD.8 The database
provides information on parents and global subsidiaries, allowing for the construction of
a comprehensive MNE panel. We use the following variables reported in ORBIS: Fixed
assets, fixed intangible assets, total assets, sales, EBIT, number of employees, cost of em-
ployees. We cover the time period from 2003-2011, providing nine years of firm specific
information. In order to classify MNE groups, we start with the immediate ownership
indicated in ORBIS dropping all parent observations (and associated subsidiaries) with
consolidated accounts, as we require information on the specific activities of each parent
and subsidiary.
Table 1 depicts our sample selection. We select all parents owning a foreign subsidiary
with at least 50% of its shares, which amounts to around 42,048 immediate parents own-
ing 138,115 subsidiaries (domestic and foreign). Our analysis is focused on subsidiaries
only. Approximately 5000 of the companies in the subsidiary sample are also parents. We
eliminate these from our sample but add them again as part of our robustness checks. We
limit our sample to observations in OECD member states, though this still includes global
information on the tax differences for each MNE group. Moreover, our analysis requires
basic accounting information for all MNE groups, meaning that all basic variables need
to be available for at least 3 years, profitability of subsidiaries in a given year, and suffi-
cient country and industry coverage. This selection criterion reduces our sample by more
than 60 percent, possibly resulting in a bias as incomplete accounting information may be
correlated to less transparent corporate governance and more aggressive tax optimization.9
8See OECD 2010 for a comprehensive summary.
9Such a bias would likely result in an underestimation of findings on aggregate profit shifting.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
Percentage of
Step Description Affiliates Observations Step(x-1) Step 1
1 Downloaded 176,924 1,636,776 100.0 100.0
2 Subsidiary sample 138,115 1,243,035 75.9 75.9
3 Remove parents 133,175 1,198,575 96.4 73.2
4 Basic accounting information 51,811 466,299 38.9 28.5
5 >90% total ownership 40,172 361,548 77.5 22.1
6 Poor data removal 34,379 309,411 85.6 19.0
7 Positive profit 17,793 88,296 28.5 5.4
8 OECD 16,106 80,455 91.1 4.9
9 > 10 Affiliates 16,081 80,369 99.9 4.9
Notes: Step 3 - remove parents that are also part of the subsidiary sample. Step 4 - three years information on
EBIT, cost of employees and fixed assets available. Step 5 - minimum of 90% ownership in the chain from parent
to affiliate. Step 6 - exclude affiliates having zero cost of employees, negative fixed, total, or intangible assets. Step
7 - exclude observations where EBIT, cost of employees or fixed assets are negative. Step 9 - exclude countries and
industries having ≤ 10 affiliates.
3.2 Industry Classification
We rely on the European Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) for the ordering of
MNEs across sectors. The starting point for our classification of an MNE groups industry
is the industry assignment of each affiliate provided in the ORBIS database. Generally, we
aggregate industries at the first level of the alphabetical NACE codes. For sectors, such as
manufacturing, where our sample includes more than 1000 MNEs at the first level, we also
differentiate activities at the second and/or third level in the NACE hierarchy. Moreover,
we group all affiliates designated as holding, head office activity, trust, funds and similar
financial entities10 together in a single holding category and discard those industries with
less than 10 multinationals in our sectoral analysis. For all affiliates across our sample we
differentiate a total of 40 industries (see Annex 2). A simple descriptive analysis of our data
presented in Figure 1 below, reveals noticeable differences in both intangible endowments
of affiliates across different sectors as well as a major variance in the complexity of the
MNE groups these affiliates belong to.
10This category may include internal financing companies.
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Figure 1: Industries by Intangibles and Complexity
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The axis labeled Complexity depicts the logarithm of the number of different 2-digit NACE codes within a MNE
group. The axis labeled Intangible to Total Assets depicts the ratio of intangible to total assets in percent. Thick
lines depict median.
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3.3 Documentation Requirements
Our information on the introduction of documentation rules is taken from several sources,
including the Transfer Pricing Guide of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(IBFD), transfer pricing country summaries prepared by PricewaterhouseCooper, Ernst
and Young, Deloitte, and KPMG, as well as country assessments in transfer pricing jour-
nals. An overview of our country classification based on these sources is provided in the
Annex. Reflecting the increasing importance of transfer pricing regulation, the share of
observations in our sample that has been covered by documentation rules has risen from
12 percent in 2003 to about 80 percent in 2011.
Figure 2: Documentation Requirements with Penalty Effect in the Sample
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Notes: Bars depict share of observations located in jurisdictions with documentation requirements.
Black line depicts average tax rate of observations.
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3.4 Estimation Approach
Our basic estimation approach is summarized by
ln(piit) = α+ β1CitDif + δXit + ρt + νi + it.
Our main measure of reported profits pi is Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), thus
excluding intercompany financing decisions.11 The variable CitDif specifies the differential
of the statutory Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate between the subsidiary and the rest of
the MNE group. This variable is the main indicator of profit shifting behavior and its
coefficient is expected to take a negative value. A vector of control variables is depicted by
Xit, including the main input factors such as fixed assets, cost of employees, the MNE’s
aggregate assets, and country factors such as GDP, GDP per capita, the unemployment
rate, and corruption based on the World Bank control of corruption index. Finally, we
include industry year effects (ρt), and firm specific fixed effects (νi).
In subsequent specifications, we introduce affiliate and MNE specific variables. A variable
denoted IntTotAs, depicts the ratio of intangibles to total assets held by a subsidiary. We
obtain information on intangibles from the ORBIS database, which collects this information
from publicly available sources. The value of intangibles in our sample could thus be
affected by differences in the underlying country-specific accounting standards; particularly
in Austria, Denmark and Germany, where self-created intangibles are not recognized on
the balance sheet.12 Another variable, denoted COMPLEX, categorizes the number of
sectors covered by each MNE group (taking the 2nd level of the NACE classification as a
reference). Both variables are interacted with the tax differential in order to assess their
effect on tax driven profitability. We expect both to increase profit shifting tendencies.
In addition, we introduce DOC, a variable representing the number years since manda-
tory documentation requirements have been introduced. We only capture situations where
the lack of documentation has an effect on penalties, i.e. when multinational affiliates or
parents are penalized for not preparing comprehensive documentation, or where the prepa-
ration of documentation helps shield taxpayers from penalties or reduces their amount
(as is the case for instance in Australia, the U.K., and Italy). This classification follows
11Heckemeyer and Overesch (2012) find that transfer pricing is the main profit shifting channel.
12Our robustness checks illustrate, however, that these differences do not substantially alter our findings
(See: Table 5 in the Annex). For a detailed discussion of the balance sheet item intangible fixed asset
see: Dischinger and Riedel (2011)
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the assumption that documentation disclosure requirements and a link of documentation
preparation to the penalty regime provide a strong incentive, likely changing taxpayer be-
havior. To take account of the incentive for tax administrations to protect their domestic
tax base, we only capture documentation rules for subsidiaries where a risk of outward
shifting exists, i.e. the variable takes the value zero when the tax differential is negative.
We model the impact of documentation requirements with a quadratic time trend start-
ing with the year of introduction of these provisions in order to allow for the expected
non-linear effect.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Aggregate findings
Our results are depicted in Tables 2 and 3 below. The first specification in table 2 illustrates
the extent of profit-shifting in our sample. In line with findings reported by Heckemeyer
and Overesch (2012) in a recent meta-study, we find a significant negative coefficient with
a semi-elasticity of 1.02. This implies that an increase in a jurisdictions Corporate Income
Tax rate by one percentage point results in an average decrease of subsidiary EBIT by 1.02
percent. As expected, our subsidiary input variables (fixed assets and cost of employees)
as well as the aggregate assets held by the whole MNE group are explaining changes in
EBIT across our sample.
In specification 2 and 3 we display our findings on the drivers of profit shifting. The
second column presents the effect of the ratio of intangibles over total assets held by a
subsidiary. The interaction term is negative with a magnitude of 3.34 and significant at
the five percent level. This finding indicates a higher semi-elasticity of profits derived from
intangibles at the subsidiary level. The coefficient of IntTotAs is highly significant and
negative. This is due to the variable being defined as a ratio, with total assets in the
denominator capturing effects of the capital stock.
In the third specification we try to approach supply-chain complexity by constructing a
variable on the industry coverage within the MNE group. The main assumption being that
the more complex an MNE structure is, the more opportunities there are to take advantage
of profit shifting strategies. This measure is obviously strongly correlated to firm size, but
by including total aggregate MNE group assets into our specifications we isolate the effect
of complexity. Being negative with a magnitude of 0.09, our coefficient depicts a significant
effect of MNE complexity, partly explaining profit-shifting tendencies.
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Columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 depict a re-estimation of specification 1 for different sub-samples.
We divide the sample at the median for both high and low intangible subsidiaries as well as
for subsidiaries that are part of complex and simple MNE group structures. The results are
consistent with our findings, with higher significance levels and magnitudes for the subsets
of high intangible and complex subsidiaries. Overall, these findings suggest that there are
indeed significant differences in profit shifting behavior, depending on the complexity of
MNE groups and the ratio of intangibles of each subsidiary.
4.2 Mitigation Results
Table 3 below summarizes our findings on the effect of documentation rules. The first
specification re-estimates the sensitivity of EBIT to CIT changes. The second specification
introduces an interaction of the tax difference with the variable capturing the existence of
documentation rules. Taking the non-monotonicity of its effects into account, we find that
the introduction of documentation rules has initially a negative, but not significant, effect
on subsidiary profitability. This result may be partly explained by the additional costs
stemming from the need to prepare detailed documentation.13 The second-order term,
however, is positive and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.003. This indicates that
documentation rules become effective in mitigating profit shifting with a time lag.
Figure 3 illustrates these findings. A little more than two years after their introduction,
we observe that documentation starts reducing overall profit shifting in the economies in
our sample. The semi-elasticity of subsidiary EBIT is reduced by 0.64 within 4 years
following enforcement through documentation rules, translating into mitigation of about
60 percent of the observed profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample. These
aggregate findings support our assumption that the learning curve of tax administrations
using additional information at their disposal does indeed translate into more substantial
mitigation over time.
The following specifications differentiate our findings for subsidiaries with high and low
intangible ratios as well as for those affiliates part of more complex and simple MNE group
structures. In line with our predictions, we find significant variation. No significant effect
of documentation on subsidiaries with a high intangible to total asset ratio can be observed,
whereas mitigation can be observed among low intangible affiliates, who are, however, less
13Documentation is usually either done locally or by a centralized transfer pricing unit, resulting in signif-
icant costs.
13
Table 3: Mitigation Regression
Dependent: log of EBIT
Sample All Affiliates High Int. Low Int. Complex Simple
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CitDif -1.02*** -1.12*** -1.21*** -0.95** -1.37*** -0.78*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.36) (0.38) (0.32) (0.41)
zDOC 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
zDOC2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CitDif:zDOC -0.09 -0.12 -0.19 -0.04 -0.12
(0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.2) (0.29)
CitDif:zDOC2 0.09*** 0.05 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
log(FixAs) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(CoEmp) 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.4***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(IntAs) 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.02*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(MNEA) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Gdp/106) -0.07 -0.05 -0.18* -0.01 0.08 -0.16*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
GdpPc 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corruption 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Unemployment -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year dummies X X X X X X
# Observations 78,987 78,987 39,491 39,492 40,383 38,604
# Affiliates 16,036 16,036 10,017 10,941 7,904 8,132
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
First two columns estimate specification for the full sample. Columns 4− 6 reestimate specification of column 2 for
subsamples being characterised by above (below) median intangible to total assets ratio (Column 3 and 4) and by
above (below) median number of different 2-digit NACE codes within the MNE (Column 5 and 6). The variable
counting years since introduction of documentation requirements (DOC) is centred around its mean (zDOC), in order
to reduce correlation with its square. MNEA are aggregate assets of the multinational group minus fixed assets of
subsidiary.
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likely to shift profits in the first place (see Fig. 3 for a graphical illustration). In the
case of our complexity variable, the opposite is true. A significant mitigation effect can be
observed among affiliates of more complex MNE groups; illustrating that firm complexity
poses less of a challenge to effective domestic enforcement than the appropriate pricing of
intangible assets.
Figure 3: Mitigation of Profit Shifting
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Lines depict estimated elasticity of EBIT with respect to the tax differential CitDif as a (quadratic) function of time
since introduction of documentation requirements. Solid line gives estimation results based on the whole sample.
Grey lines depict 95% confidence interval of the linear combination based on a robust covariance matrix estimation
for the whole sample. Dashed (dotted) line depicts estimation results for the subsample of affiliates with a intangible
to total assets ratio above (below) median.
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4.3 Industry Results
The simple descriptive analysis presented earlier (Fig. 1) already revealed noticeable differ-
ences in both intangible endowments of affiliates across different sectors as well as a major
variation in the complexity of the MNE groups these affiliates belong to. Consequently,
we expect major differences in actual profit shifting behavior across these sectors. Table
4 illustrates that this is indeed the case. Using the same general set-up of the estimation
strategy discussed above it provides estimates of profit shifting disaggregated by 40 indus-
try categories. Dividing our sample, we estimate profit shifting for each sector separately.
The columns labeled Estimate in Table 4 present these sector-specific results.
Our results broadly follow the predictions that can be made based on the descriptive
depiction in Fig. 1. Sectors with a significant and negative coefficient of the tax differential
include Health, Petroleum production, Administrative as well as Other services; all above
the median for both the share of intangibles to total assets and the complexity of their
MNE group structure. Notably, and differing from most other sectors in our sample,14 the
result for the mining sector is highly sensitive to the inclusion of our corruption variable.
The negative coefficient for the sector becomes significant once we drop our control for
corruption. Data services and retail subsidiaries are among the group with the highest
intangible ratio whereas real estate subsidiaries tend to be part of highly complex MNEs,
though they have a low intangible to total asset ratio. Management subsidiaries are close
to the median for intangibles and above the complexity median. Of the sectors with a
significant negative profit-shifting coefficient only transportation and household wholesale
are below both the median for complexity and the intangible ratio. We find no statistically
significant trends for holding subsidiaries, manufacturers in the pharmaceutical sector and
publishing affiliates despite a high intangible ratio in these sectors. These findings could
be driven by a range of sector-specific factors, in particular the role of preferential tax
treatment accorded to several industries, which limit the importance of statutory income
tax rates and thus undermine their predictive power. Holding subsidiaries, for instance,
typically function as a conduit for various payments (dividends, interest and royalties).
Countries in our sample with favorable holding regimes such as the Netherlands or Lux-
embourg thus derive their attractiveness from extensive treaty networks and the limitation
or absence of withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties. In the Netherlands,
for instance, foreign profits can be repatriated into a Dutch holding subsidiary with an
14A similar effect can be observed for legal and accounting services and household wholesale.
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Table 4: Industry Regression
Dependent variable is logarithm of EBIT
Explanatory variable depicted is CitDif
Industry Estimate Industry Estimate
admin.service -3.02*** management -4.91**
(1.16) (2.00)
agriculture -1.5 media.man -0.14
(3.67) (2.21)
apparel.man -1.37 mining -1.96
(2.41) (2.4)
chem.man -1.76 motor.man 1.75
(1.25) (1.83)
construction -1.16 nonmetal.man -0.17
(1.19) (0.88)
dataservice -2.77** not known 1.05
(1.37) (4.49)
education -8.89 other.man -0.04
(7.95) (1.65)
energy -3.84 otherservice -5.52*
(3.11) (3.09)
engineering 0.68 paper.man -1.95
(1.02) (1.99)
entertainment 8.15** petrol.man -14.85*
(3.64) (7.48)
financial -1.62 pharma.man 4.64
(3.75) (3.24)
food/tobacco.man -0.98 publishing -0.51
(1.33) (1.78)
health -6.66* realestate -1.81
(3.79) (2.13)
holding 0.46 retail -2.97***
(1.8) (0.96)
household.whole -1.15** rubber.man -0.37
(0.57) (1.19)
insurance 6.1 ship.man 1.84
(9.21) (4.07)
IT.man 0.97 tourism 1.12
(1.3) (2.41)
legal and accounting 4.29 transport -5.64***
(3.62) (1.66)
machinery.man -1.33 water -1.39
(1.13) (2.72)
machinery.whole -0.32 wharehousing -0.58
(0.58) (1.31)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Regression
controls for firm specific fixed effects, industry year effects.
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exemption from income taxation. The allocation of profits towards holding subsidiaries
in jurisdictions with high Corporate Income Tax rates is thus likely the result of very low
effective rates in these jurisdictions. Consequently, our analysis, based on differences of the
statutory corporate income tax rate, falls short when looking at holding company arrange-
ments. Similarly, preferential tax treatment accorded to entertainment MNE activities in
high tax jurisdictions, resulting in low effective tax rates, may explain the counterintuitive
result of a significant and positive effect of the tax differential for this sector.
5 Conclusion
In trying to explain the drivers of global profit shifting by MNEs, we analyzed the role
of intangible assets and the complexity of MNE group structures. Our panel regression
based on company information provided in the global ORBIS dataset provides evidence
that both variables are indeed significant determinants of profit shifting activities. We find
that subsidiaries with a high intangible to total asset ratio have a semi-elasticity of 1.2
compared to 0.78 for low intangible affiliates, suggesting a significantly larger sensitivity
to CIT rate changes. Similarly, subsidiaries belonging to more complex MNE groups have
a higher semi-elasticity (1.11) than those that are part of less complex entities (0.81).
Further differentiation for 40 industries confirmed important differences in the magnitude
of shifting behavior across sectors, largely following our predictions. Additionally, our
findings on the documentation rules support and extend the observations of earlier studies
highlighting the importance of domestic enforcement efforts. Focusing on the introduction
of documentation requirements, a narrow but straightforward proxy for the enforcement
of transfer pricing provisions at the national level, we find significant non-linear mitigation
effects. On average, the estimated profit shifting among MNE subsidiaries in our sample
is reduced by 60 percent four years after the introduction of mandatory documentation
requirements. Our findings suggest, however, that documentation rules do not help address
profit shifting risks of intangible intensive subsidiaries. Taking the perspective of host
country tax administrations, the findings of our research provide initial insights on the
relative profit-shifting risk associated with different sectors of MNE activities.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks
Dependent: log of EBIT
Sample All Subs No Holding Whole Group Without AT, DE and DK
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CitDif -0.76*** -0.82*** -0.54*** -0.58** -0.41*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.24) (0.24)
IntTotAs -0.81***
(0.08)
CitDif:IntTotAs -5.33***
(1.61)
log(FixAs) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(CoEmp) 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.37***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(IntAs) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(MNEA) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Gdp/106) -0.05 -0.06 -0.09** -0.12** -0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
GdpPc 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corruption 0.00 0.00 0.05* 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year dummies X X X X X
# Observations 86,911 85,537 131,104 103,084 103,080
# Affiliates 17,748 17,391 25,516 19,377 19,376
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Model
1 extends the baseline sample, including all industries and all countries available. Model 2 restricts the sample of
Model 1 by excluding holding affiliates. Model 3 adds parents and reintroduces holding companies. Model 4 and 5
restricts the sample of Model 3 to observations that are not in Austria, Germany or Denmark.
Table 6: Sample Description
Variable Observations Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max.
EBIT 80369 3636.56 420 25456.02 1 2063614
Cost of employees 80369 7431.51 1178 60535.00 1 7014746
Fixed assets 80369 19351.89 657 200034.85 1 16185596
Intangible assets 78987 4030.06 4 110574.72 0 13491422
Intangible to total assets 78983 0.03 0 0.09 0 1
MNE Assets 80369 929045.69 72097 6351144.34 3 199460828
CitDif 80369 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.2 0.19
Complexity 80369 4.7 4 4.07 1 54
DOC 80369 0.7 0 1.73 0 16
GDP 80369 1241316.06 1044610 1009996.36 9840.74 3623690
GDP per capita 80369 35520.51 35073.16 16537.6 5674.74 114508.38
Corruption 80369 1.2 1.34 0.69 -0.05 2.56
Unemployment 80369 8.29 7.9 3.3 2.5 20.1
Growth rate 80369 1.67 1.81 2.9 -14.07 10.49
21
Table 7: Industry Description
Industry Obs. Aff. EBIT CoEmp FixAs IntAs IntRatio Comp. Doc Tax
admin.service 3766 812 3011,25 13351,95 22987,51 4131,21 4,12 5,06 0,43 0,3
agriculture 634 145 604,4 945,63 4762,38 74,62 1,56 3,91 0,42 0,29
apparel.man 840 162 1144,94 2965,5 6063,06 1068,66 2,3 4,11 0,36 0,31
chem.man 1743 306 5723,47 6946,89 36286,39 6704,07 4,48 4,49 0,44 0,31
construction 3921 789 1468,18 6174,54 3875,09 639,02 1,35 7,2 0,34 0,31
dataservice 2971 669 1850,54 9096,1 5430,3 2572,85 6,1 4,1 0,45 0,29
education 222 59 1069,71 3125,81 5169,95 554,42 5,49 4,02 0,5 0,3
energy 498 101 28458,92 10173,55 238506,33 27808,95 3,81 4,52 0,5 0,29
engineering 4142 857 2914,96 6924,39 9578,82 1984,24 3,5 4,76 0,42 0,3
entertainment 473 102 1936,7 2275,74 10264,12 1711,4 6,18 5,95 0,4 0,31
financial 826 192 4962,04 11203,86 21612,16 2041,83 3,38 4,37 0,41 0,29
food/tobacco.man 1978 343 4970,18 7677,92 37550,7 4528,16 2,76 4,16 0,36 0,3
health 528 95 1813,17 5001,7 10265,59 1842,32 6,49 5,47 0,32 0,32
holding 1397 356 19947,18 64505,83 231525,58 90458,31 7,95 4,84 0,54 0,31
household.whole 10772 2097 2575,1 3521,91 7211,21 785,49 2,19 4 0,44 0,29
insurance 84 17 2248,89 2364,23 1240,43 335,33 4,97 3,43 0,31 0,31
IT.man 2353 426 3898,94 9214,14 10072,35 1460,33 2,75 5,27 0,4 0,3
legal and accounting 317 72 1839,65 7280,83 6833,07 966,54 3,77 6,88 0,41 0,29
machinery.man 2718 492 3058,57 6334,39 7065,17 872,22 2,71 4,39 0,41 0,31
machinery.whole 11132 2140 1827,53 2702,98 3892,47 539,87 1,96 4,29 0,46 0,28
management 1208 271 1985,57 12614,17 12006,46 6236,01 2,94 4,88 0,44 0,3
media.man 437 86 956,59 2753,03 4965,08 341,7 2,87 3,6 0,4 0,3
mining 658 117 17120,84 7486,15 46491,72 5344,45 4,6 5,82 0,38 0,29
motor.man 1262 223 8127,66 19241,5 50164,99 2934,53 1,73 4,46 0,42 0,28
nonmetal.man 5086 933 4036,75 6194 16293,97 754,59 1,68 4,75 0,38 0,3
not known 469 147 2771,62 6823,13 10314,06 2250,88 3,78 4,84 0,24 0,29
other.man 1775 336 2280,88 3488,85 7347,12 1323,66 2,85 4,77 0,42 0,29
otherservice 516 115 2855,34 9155,89 7311,64 2324,9 5,92 5,7 0,38 0,3
paper.man 1223 224 4810,54 6727,31 33812,09 369,61 1,4 4,74 0,44 0,29
petrol.man 96 19 24205,06 13552,32 641741,83 32495,39 5,77 5,91 0,32 0,31
pharma.man 411 69 13931,92 29789,91 56632,72 16195,7 6,17 4,21 0,46 0,32
publishing 1932 418 10827,28 8150,71 41698,97 21157,24 6,32 4,93 0,44 0,3
realestate 1633 420 1164,71 1458,27 13859 409,95 1,79 5,96 0,39 0,3
retail 3364 727 2834,43 6546,02 12336,26 1103,03 5,05 4,51 0,4 0,3
rubber.man 2049 362 4674,7 8146,33 15103,71 468,98 2,27 4,7 0,41 0,3
ship.man 312 63 10909,33 31506,27 96094,9 50916,1 3,78 6,09 0,42 0,3
tourism 1379 304 1080,98 7843,68 9029,79 656,5 4,81 4,11 0,33 0,31
transport 1875 370 1973,02 5637,07 9191,8 1253,26 2,57 4,28 0,34 0,3
water 789 140 2275,83 5499,18 19453,2 1976,31 3,36 6,72 0,34 0,31
wharehousing 2580 505 1514,19 5024 8689,53 1342,33 2,22 4,43 0,39 0,3
The first and second column present the number of observations and number of affiliates, respectively. Industry
means of the accounting variables EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets, intangible assets, the ratio of intangible
to total assets is presented in the following columns. The column labeled Comp. depicts the number of different
nace sectors that is observed on average across the MNE group. Doc gives percentage of observations over years
2003-2011, where documentation was required. Tax presents mean tax rate over this period.
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Table 8: Country Description
Iso Code Observations Affiliates EBIT CoEmp FixAs IntAs IntTotAs Complex Doc Mean-tax
AT 1331 344 4907,69 11725,1 19481,22 2703,59 2,39 4,93 0,23 0,26
BE 8328 1397 1498,1 3935,02 14466,91 674,6 1,76 4,32 0 0,34
CZ 5484 1034 2422,36 2807,85 8568,4 195,81 0,9 4,32 0 0,23
DE 5571 1262 7052,22 14221,09 39716,95 6001,91 2,79 4,69 1 0,34
DK 2284 691 1536,59 4403,41 7481,81 1903,67 3,26 4,05 1 0,25
EE 1287 255 1049,59 1113,26 6875,16 79,12 1,27 3,76 0,57 0,23
ES 12464 2477 3710,8 5611,32 22899,33 2743,11 3,7 4,17 0,32 0,33
FI 1943 337 1798,34 4511,14 4484,52 1091,15 3,82 4,13 0,58 0,27
FR 6784 1170 3340,89 11829 13330,6 1949,56 4,54 6,53 0,2 0,34
GB 6905 1476 6695,85 16055,28 37026,63 13738,61 4,05 4,52 0,47 0,29
HU 392 80 1423,48 3129,32 13928,25 1409,23 1,27 5,93 0,23 0,17
IE 605 177 3557,34 4080,66 15226,59 10384,7 3,42 4,28 0,16 0,12
IT 10556 2004 3539,06 7232,03 17720,8 5632,91 4,23 6,04 0,24 0,35
KR 135 20 5481,3 4838,47 10302,76 255,75 0,7 8,83 1 0,27
LU 637 167 6442,48 4278,98 19566,67 849,04 2,39 4,18 0 0,29
NL 1504 388 8140,19 20163,57 61008,64 31002,06 3,62 4,3 1 0,28
NO 4102 772 2640,12 5573,35 11817,57 3052,79 3,73 3,76 0,5 0,28
PL 4001 848 3208,91 2699,37 14122,14 420,56 1,09 4,09 1 0,19
PT 2367 472 2237,5 2638,78 8976,98 615,21 2,32 3,81 1 0,26
SE 1249 213 5165,61 11459,05 19755,82 1091,08 2,63 4,85 0,59 0,27
SI 739 130 1592,59 2732,51 8526,57 206,74 1,28 4,38 0,82 0,24
SK 1701 367 2017,48 1749,84 5826,85 259,98 0,65 3,67 0,32 0,19
The first and second column present the number of observations and number of affiliates, respectively. Country
means of the accounting variables EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets, intangible assets, the ratio of intangible
to total assets is presented in the following columns. The column labeled Comp. depicts the number of different
nace sectors that is observed on average across the MNE group. Doc gives percentage of observations over years
2003-2011, where documentation was required. Tax presents mean tax rate over this period.
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